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*SAP - STANDARD

SECURITY ASESSMENT PROFILE

REPORT

LJ Frick

ID: 810505xxxxxxx

Assessment Date: 2020-04-02

INTEGRITY INTERNATIONAL

Report date: 2022-02-18

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SECURITY ASSESSMENT PROFILE

SUMMARIZED REPORT

Assessment Date: 2020-04-02

ORG: INTEGRITY INTERNATIONAL

NAME: LJ Frick
ID: 810505xxxxxxx

SCHOOL GRADE: 12	**PSIRA GRADE:** A	**GENDER:**	**Male**
DRIVER'S LICENSE: Yes	**CODE:** EC	**FIREARM COMPETENCY:** Yes	

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INTEGRATED SECURITY RATING (ISR)			**6**
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A high score on Impulsivity, Leniency, Denial, Stress and Aggressiveness would thus mean that the person measures positively on these factors in that he tends **NOT** to be impulsive, lenient, aggressive, denial or stress-orientated.

+ A high score on 'Suspiciousness & Non-Trusting' would, however, mean that the person is Suspicious and Non-Trusting of others and/or situations – i.e., that is considered to be a plus factor.

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SECURITY **A**SSESSMENT **P**ROFILE

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PART 1

1 COGNITIVE

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | **5** | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

The Cognitive function is perhaps the most important factor – more in a **'knock-out'** sense. Without a certain minimum ability in this area, the candidate will not be able to perform particular functions effectively, e.g. use his* discretion well under the pressure of time in specifically complex situations. This factor is a given fact. It is genetic in nature and cannot be enhanced to any significant degree.

It is especially important during the **selection process** to ensure that the right human *material* with sufficient cognitive levels are entering the organisation and during the **profile fitting process** to ensure that the right people with the *appropriate mix* of special cognitive factors/constructs are appointed to the positions requiring that particular profile.

1.1 Analytical Ability

| 1 | 2 | 3 | **4** | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

It is important for the effective security functionary to be able to identify the various elements/parts a situation consists of and how it interacts in a logical (cause effect) manner and to find ways of dealing with these issues and taking balanced and sound decisions as to which solutions will deal with the situation best.

It is also important to be sensitive and realistic to the fact that various levels of security positions will typically be confronted by different situations with different levels of complexity and that the level of Analytical Ability needed to effectively deal with them, will vary accordingly – but a certain degree will always be required.

1.2 Spatial Ability

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | **5** | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

It is especially important on the 'operations' level of security work for the practitioner to be able to perceive fixed geometric or spatial relations amongst objects accurately and to be able to visualise how they might look if rotated, changed in position and/or structure or added to in any way. It must at least be a *sensitivity* to changes in the environment, but ideally also the ability to perceive and *interpret* any of these changes.

1.3 Perceptual Reasoning

| 1 | 2 | 3 | **4** | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

That is the ability to 'reason out' the principle and meaning at the very basis of matters the person is *exposed* to in order to, not only understand it, but to obtain control over it – i.e. the ability to reason with symbols and shapes in general terms.

*Please Note – Reference to the male gender, likewise, applies to the female gender.

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1.4 Verbal & Logical Reasoning

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | **7** | 8 | 9 | 10 |

This is the ability to understand the obvious and intended meaning of words as well as deducing any logical relation there may be to it − i.e. to reason with words.

The effective security practitioner must not only understand the spoken word, but 'read' and interpret that which is logically related thereto. **Effective communication** is of critical importance to the security industry.

1.5 Acuity/Detail Perception

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | **7** | 8 | 9 | 10 |

This is the ability and sensitivity to the *smallest detail* in the person's environment and the changes that may take place related thereto – being sharp, quick and accurate in detecting details, shifts, movements, positions, etc. relative to matters and situations the person is exposed to.

The effective security functionary must be *alert, sharp and responsive* as well as questioning any issue and the smallest detail around him. That is in some cases the strongest differential attribute and ability between the more effective functionary and the average person – especially at the 'operational' security level.

It is clear from the above that the cognitive ability is of crucial and determining importance in effective security work – perhaps more than some of the other skills and abilities, because they can be learned through training and experience while the mental capacity is a genetically given factor.

PART II - <u>COMPOSITE INTEGRITY</u>
THE CIAS-MODEL

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | **5** | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

According to the CIAS-Model © (Composite Integrity Assessment Strategy), the assessment of integrity in the world of work includes the concept known as Work Ethic - with special emphasis on the integrity-related factors constituting this concept. In the case of the Security job, the more classic five factors constituting the *Integrity* construct related to this position are used to abstract information from the candidate and are reported on as such as well as the five more crucial factors related to the concept of *Work Ethic* and the scores on these two substructure scales are combined in a weighted process to represent the more ***comprehensive CIAS-assessment model of integrity*** as the PART II-scale in the Summarized Report.

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2. INTEGRITY

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | **5** | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

Security functionaries, as well as so many security organisations, differentiate themselves on this single factor, namely Integrity – even if it is only on the perceived image of being of high integrity or not; BUT images are more often than not <u>true</u>!

Integrity is a complex and multi-facetted concept and cannot easily be assessed validly and reliably with a short measuring approach – even tailor-made to fit the uniqueness of one homogenic subject; as in this instance. The shortened approach can, however, render a very good indication of what the integrity of the testee is in general terms – and that is the objective in this instance. If the objective is to obtain a clinical diagnoses of the entire profile of a person's integrity for counselling and/or developmental purposes, a more comprehensive and dedicated integrity instrument is required , such as the IMI or even the IP-200 that are dedicated integrity tests in the market.

The **SAP** contains the **five integrity areas** that prove to be more critical to measuring integrity optimally in terms of the uniqueness as associated with the security industry.

2.1 Reliability & Dependability

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | **5** | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

A **_high 'score'_** in this factor is indicative of people who are on time, will do what they say they will and/or what they are supposed to do and will not disappoint others easily.

A **_low 'score'_** on the other hand, is indicative of people whose timekeeping is most probably poor and are people that will more often than not disappoint others by not doing what is expected of them or not living up to their promises.

2.2 Honesty

| 1 | 2 | 3 | **4** | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

Honesty is a _core factor_ to integrity. There are different types of honesty, e.g., Historical Dishonesty, Honesty as a Central Value and Opportunistic or 'Futuristic' Dishonesty that is related to the degree of enticement it most probably will take to produce deviant behaviour in a person. A specialised integrity measuring instrument would be required to assess all of these variations, e.g., the IP-200. The **SAP** will give the user just one best-fit assessment of the **general** orientation of the testee to **honesty** per sé – i.e., the probability of the person stealing, lying or acting inappropriately as presented here on a 10-point scale.

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2.3 Predictability - 'Real Self'

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**8**	9	10

This factor assesses the extent to which the person is **pretending** to be what he is not. This is typical behaviour of people with low integrity. It is difficult to predict how such people will react under various circumstances.

People that measure **high** on this factor tend to rather be highly predictable people – they are what they are and they have what they claim to have; for example, academic qualifications. You can take them at face value.

A person that is particularly **low** on this ability/factor (e.g., below '4'/'3') is usually 'bluffing'; even to himself. This factor is closely related to lying, undependability and using extreme rationalisation and defence mechanisms.

2.4 Impulsivity and Instant Gratification of (own) Needs and Self-Centredness

1	2	3	4	**5**	6	7	8	9	10

A **high 'score'** on this combined factor will mean that the person is **not** susceptible to impulsive behaviour and to instantly gratifying his own needs and to being self-centred, but would also to be sensitive to the interests of others and to also 'invest' in tomorrow. This is a person with a longer term vision and who is 'calculating' what the *risk* attached to his behaviour would be under various circumstances – the interest of the organisation comes first and not necessary his own interests and needs.

A **low score** would represent a more impulsive type of person who is more self-centred than the average individual in the population. At a very low level, the testees' self-interest may be of such importance to themselves that the decision they take and their resultant behaviour, may not serve the best corporate interest – this may even become pathological in nature when extremely low – for example a '3' or below; the lower the worse.

2.5 Leniency – Tolerating Deviant Behaviour in Others

1	2	3	4	**5**	6	7	8	9	10

This factor assesses the degree to which the person being measured, is tolerating deviant behaviour in others.

A **high score** in this factor would be indicative of a person that would **not** tolerate deviant behaviour in others – this will preferably apply more so to people in supervisory capacity.

Superiors with very **low scores** on this factor would allow their subordinates to get away with murder – so to speak. They will also be more susceptible to 'upwards' delegation – i.e. to allow their subordinates to pass their work and decision-making up to them.

Integrity is rubbing off on others and people with low leniency scores, will actually enhance the growth of a culture of corruption and deviant behaviour – the opposite is of course also true.

An integrated composition of the scores the person received on the above factors, will provide him with the single most representative score of his **Integrity** in general terms. This 'score' is also reported on in the Summarised Report.

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3. WORK ETHIC

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | **5** | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

The typical orientation people have to work can differ significantly. There may be many reasons for such a difference, but in the end it reflects itself in practice. Some people may be absolutely committed to work per sé; being motivated to do well, to taking responsibility and co-operating fully in order to ensure success at work, while others may offer a hundred and one reasons to justify their 'failure' at work. It is not people in the latter category that are required in the security field.

Although there are many factors associated with people with a high *Work Ethic*, the five factors with the strongest predictive relationship with good Work Ethic were selected through practical research and are used in the **SAP.**

3.1 Work Centredness & Commitment

| 1 | 2 | 3 | **4** | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

People who are **high** on this factor put their work first and those who are very high on this orientation live for their work and will be prepared to do anything for their job – they are absolutely committed to their job and what is related thereto.

People that are **low** on this factor is more 'balanced' in this regard – life has many facets, in their perception, of which work is only one. Those who rate very low on this factor consider work to be but a necessary burden/evil to earn a living and they may in many instances find 'good' reason not to give their very best at work. It will obviously be risky to rely on them.

3.2 Motivation and Results/Goal/Completion Drivenness

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | **6** | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

A **high** 'score' in this area is associated with people who are motivated under most circumstances to work hard and give their best to reach the goals they set for themselves or finishing the project/task once they have started with it.   They will overcome obstacles that present themselves in the process as these hindrances come about. The *process* is usually not as important to them as reaching the goal – obtaining the end result.

A l**ow** 'score' again is indicative of a person who will 'follow the stream' so to speak, and will readily be put off track by difficulties and hindrances in the process of reaching his objective – the personal drive is lacking in these cases and they are not at all good supervisory material.

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3.3 Responsibility & Sense of Duty

1	2	3	4	5	**6**	7	8	9	10

High 'scores' are in these cases related to people for whom responsibility is second nature, someone who appreciates it to be given responsibility and who considers it an honour to accept additional responsibility – a person who will walk the proverbial extra mile without any objection. This is typically a person with a well-developed Sense of Duty (accepting <u>ownership</u>); a person who feels personally responsible for success at work – or success during his shift or project.

People with very **low** 'scores' in this area, object to any significant degree of responsibility coming their way. They will actually detest the entire concept of being held accountable for anything and will not be the best choice for people in charge of a group or project or even a task of any importance. They may easily feel exploited if new/additional responsibility is (seemingly) passed on to them. On the most extreme low level (for example a '2' or less), he may even resort to Counterproductive Work Behaviour (CWB) by deliberately 'harming' the corporate objective.

3.4 Co-operation, Supportiveness & Team Orientation

1	2	3	4	5	6	**7**	8	9	10

People with **strong positive orientations** in these spheres are those who will easily and naturally give their full support and work well in a team approach to reach common goals – even if it does not really involve objectives of their choice and/or working with people they really like very much.

People with **low** 'scores' in this area are either critical of the people they must work with and/or the objectives they must work towards, or they are better suited to work *independently,* on their own rather than in a group or team. Whatever the case may be, it would not be wise to put them into a group or expect them to function effectively in a team.

3.5 Denial – Projection & Rationalisation, Defence Mechanism and Justification

1	2	3	**4**	5	6	7	8	9	10

Denial, together with it's different presentations in orientation and human behaviour, has the same source and outcome; i.e. to **lie** to others and/or to yourself. The lie in some cases becomes so well imbedded, that the lie becomes the truth to the 'user' – similar to the principle at the very basis of '*images are real*'.

A person with a **good sound and healthy** orientation in this area, is someone who tends to be well related to reality, knows him well, accepts own weaknesses and strengths, is accountable for and to himself - for personal failures and faces up to the real world in real and practical terms. Such a person is normally the person in practice that he also pretends to be.

People with a **poor and unhealthy** orientation to Denial (i.e., a person with a low 'score' in this area), will usually not easily accept their own shortcomings, failures or contribution to poor performance of a group they may belong to. They may generate and present defence mechanisms and rationalisations to justify these behaviours and/or altogether deny the mere existence thereof – even to themselves. At the most extreme level these people live a lie!

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In the security field it is of particular importance for a successful functionary to measure high on Denial (i.e. not being subjected to denial), because it is crucial to receive a correct report of people regarding virtually anything that occurred on a daily basis – especially on something that might have gone 'wrong'; to have reliable intelligence to your disposal to base your decisions on.

A truthful and real-life report is, however, **not** a natural product generated by a typical person that scores low in Denial – especially when it reflects negatively on the person providing the report – i.e., himself- In the security field this is a disastrous situation – the basis of decision-making has thus become unreliable.

In conclusion, the combination and statistical integration of the above five 'scores' provides the user of the **SAP** with the one best assessment of the testee's *Work Ethic*.

The proven fact that people with high *Integrity* are usually those with a high or well-developed *Work Ethic*, justifies the integration of the 'scores' obtained in these two areas as a more reliable, valid and comprehensive assessment of the rather complex concept of Integrity – this integrated assessment is also reflected in the Summarised Report of the **SAP** as the best-fit single assessment for Part II of the instrument. This is of course a somewhat contaminated assessment and not as pure as that provided in '2' – i.e., on Integrity per sé, but it is a much more stable 'all' inclusive assessment that is based on a wider foundation.

PART III

4. COMPETENCY AND VERIFICATION

1	2	3	4	5	**6**	7	8	9	10

Part III of the Summarised Report represents the uniqueness of the security field better than any other part of the test – making it more of a *competency test* than any other part thereof. This represents a significant portion of the test – more than a third, to be exact.

It is in this part where the person's **experience** and specific **skills** in the field of security are assessed as well as important **personality attributes** like *stress*, *aggression* and *suspiciousness* and his **basic orientation** to critical factors like *timekeeping, detail and quality*, etc. and lastly, but by far not least, his **history of performance** in security work in a practical sense. These factors are submitted to further discussion and interpretative guidelines below.

4.1 Experience

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	**10**

This scale is describing and assessing the candidate's **exposure** to the professional career in Security in terms of **period** and **level** – from *no* exposure to *long* experience and from low *level* of involvement (like for example functioning only on the guard level) to functioning in the higher and more advanced supervisory or even managerial capacity.

When accepting the 'Consent for Psychometric Assessment' the candidate confirms that the information he provides is correct and that, if false information is supplied, it will automatically lead to his disqualification.

It remains, however, a self-reported portion of the assessment and should be verified as far as it is possible. or practical.*

* As an additional control, it is recommended that the verified CV the candidate brings to 'the table' during the particular assessment process, is carefully compared/checked against the scores obtained on scales 4.1 and 4.2 – if available.

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4.2 Skills & Knowledge

`1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 **10**`

This scale is describing and assessing the candidate's level of accumulated skill, ability, competency and know-how gathered in the specialized Security-sphere via experience, observation and training in this field. This represents the candidate's view on which he is reporting and it provides a good basis for questioning and discussion during a *structured interview* and may be subject to *reference checking* and verification in practical terms. The level of *PRISA* Grade and *Firearm Competency* the candidate possesses as well as the period of time he has been in possession of such are also important assessment-factors under this scale. It should be noted that it is not only the mere *possession* of such skills and knowledge that is being assessed in the test, but also the *level and degree* thereof.

Experience with the use of the **SAP** proved beyond any doubt that people that score on the *absolute lower* levels of this scale, are very much more in need of skills and knowledge in the Security-field in practical terms than those people who scored on the *higher levels* (i.e., for example at '8', '9' & '10') and that people are in general good and objective assessors regarding the level and quality of their own skills and knowledge.

4.3 Timekeeping

`1 2 3 4 **5** 6 7 8 9 10`

Good timekeeping is of crucial importance to success in security work and it stands to reason that a person who demonstrates poor timekeeping should be frowned on. The better the person's timekeeping, the higher the 'score' obtained on this scale.

4.4 Detail and Quality

`1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 **9** 10`

It was especially clear during basic research in the security sphere that a good, sound and well-developed orientation to *detail* represents an important contributing factor to success on (especially) the operational level of security work. A good security functionary must typically be very attend, alert, sharp and responsive to detail – even the smallest change in his environment must raise his attention.

It is precisely this orientation that is measured in this scale of the **SAP** – and the *more* alert and responsive the person is to practical detail, the higher the 'score' would be that he obtains in this regard.

The *opposite is also true*, but it is not a *once-off behaviour* that is measured in this case, but rather an institutionalised behavioural disposition on the part of the testee; the typical way he will respond as a rule and under all circumstances.

The orientation to detail will naturally also impact significantly on the person's *quality-orientation*.

4.5 Leadership – Potential

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | **5** | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

Although it is true that it is not necessary to be a leader, or to have the potential to become one in future, to be a good security functionary, it was, nevertheless, decided to include such scale in a dedicated security competency test. The following reasons led to this decision:

- A strong correlation was found between people with a significant potential for leadership and various other factors that are considered to be of critical importance to successful functioning in security work; e.g. a high Sense of Duty & Reliability.

- Leaders in the security sector are usually promoted from within their own ranks.

- It is considered beneficial to ensure that people who at least demonstrate the potential to develop a certain degree of leadership, be selected to enter the security function/field.

Considering the above reasons for including this factor in the assessment process, it is to be expected that the higher the 'score' obtained is in this regard, the better (the more positive) it is for the candidature of the testee.

4.6 Stress & Pressure Handling

| 1 | 2 | 3 | **4** | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

A person that is easily stressed and does not handle pressure well, should not perform security work – this is not the best work environment for him to be in.

Such people can respond in different ways, but basically it will be in a negative way. They may tend to either evade pressure or stress-causing or related situations and occasions or 'attack' it – i.e., respond aggressively towards it; both are perceived as non-productive in the work environment. In the long run continuous stress may have pathological results, e.g. depression and that is even less needed in a security work situation. People who crack under stress may present unforeseen and irrational behaviour and in the final analysis, this is the worst result or outcome of stress.

People with a high (good) 'score' on this scale tend to worry less and be more calm and collected under trying circumstances and deal with it more objectively and logically – using their available competencies better in dealing with the situations or matters in finding a solution. These people tend to respond more consistently, predictably and rationally than their counterparts who do not handle stress and pressure well – especially prolonged stress and pressure.

In general terms, an extremely low score (i.e., '3' and below) can be considered as a significant contributing factor to a 'knockout'.

4.7 Aggressiveness and Emotional Control

| 1 | 2 | 3 | **4** | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

People with low scores on this scale on the **SAP** have less control over their emotions and may be triggered to lose their calm and composure more easily than others. Some people in this category may even believe it to be a sign of weakness if they remain passive in the face of aggression.

They possess a behavioural disposition of 'fighting fire with fire' – it is considered normal, natural and right to 'hit back' in the face of aggression.

They believe you must 'stand your own' when tempted or lose face in the process.

Some people, however, have a *higher tolerance* for aggression and they can control their feelings and emotions better than others; they are identified by *higher 'scores'* on this scale of the **SAP.** These are the people with the *better record* on fighting (physically or verbally), 'pulling' a fire-arm in an argument, walking out on a meeting, aggressively opposing the chairman or differing from their immediate superior, etc.

It is obvious that people with *low scores* on Aggressiveness and Emotional Control are not the kind of people that can easily be entrusted with a loaded firearm. Neither do you want just meek and mild people in a security force – that is not what the nature and name imply; it remains in some instances *'a force'* that is needed that cannot easily be pushed around. It remains an *interpretation* that must be made by the user of the test, but it is more beneficial to manage the final decision-making process with more and better information to your disposal. There must be a mix of people, but in some positions you must reduce the risk of people losing control over their emotions or becoming too aggressive – the *profile of the job* will guide the decision-maker in this instance. In the end it boils down to taking the better logical decision in any situation; as opposed to being subjected to emotion driven action. Similar to scale 4.6, there tends to be a knockout level on the more extreme low score on this scale.

4.8. Suspiciousness & Non-Trusting

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | **6** | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

There exists sufficient proof that people who are too trusting of others and/or situations, are not necessarily good candidates for some security positions. Fieldwork indicated beyond any reasonable doubt that, especially security workers in practical *operational positions*, performed at more successful levels if they tend to be more cautions and suspicious of other and unknown/new/changing situations.

Considering the above finding, a 'healthy' degree of non-trusting and a balanced, but suspicious basic cautious-orientation to others and situations, are perceived and treated as 'plus-factors' in the scoring programme of the **SAP**.

A *higher 'score'* obtained on this scale, is thus indicative of such healthy, balanced and sound (but nevertheless) suspicious and non-trusting orientation being portrayed/demonstrated by the testee.

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It stands to reason that an unreasonably and consistently high degree of suspiciousness and non-trusting, even under positive and common and well-known situations, is also not to be considered a 'plus-factor', but the interpreter of the total profile presented by the particular testee will be sensitive to this possible deviation. It tends to be more beneficial to have a dominant orientation amongst security personnel of being, suspicious and non-trusting towards others and situations – especially 'new' unknown, not proven and suspicious 'others' and situations. The higher the score on this scale, the more pertinent this orientation is assessed to be!

4.9 History of Performance/Behaviour – e.g., Disciplinary Record

| 1 | 2 | **3** | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

This scale gives an indication as to what degree the testee performed well in his previous involvement in the security and related work careers and to what extend he was involved in deviating behaviour that might have led to corrective and/or disciplinary action.

A **high score** will naturally be representative of a good and committed career and general performance until now (the assessment date) with a clear (or at least good) disciplinary record.

This is the second obvious *verifiable item* that must be highlighted to the testee and (if possible) should be used as such by the administrators of the **SAP**. The value of a 'strong' verifiable item was mentioned before when factor 4.1 (i.e. Experience) was discussed.

This factor, together with factor 4.1, is not under the testee's control if the person is a newcomer to the world of work and/or practical involvement in the security industry per sé. The contribution that can be made by both should, however, be taken into account in the final analyses, because it does add to the 'value' of the test at this stage where a decision must be made – the higher the score the better!

An integration of all nine the above-mentioned factors, provides the user of the **SAP** with the best single 'score' representative of the employee's *combined competency* in the security sphere. The integrated score is reflected as part III on the Summarised Report.

	SAP	ORG: INTEGRITY INTERNATIONAL
INTEG	**S**ECURITY **A**SSESSMENT **P**ROFILE **EXTENDED DEFINED REPORT**	NAME: LJ Frick

PART IV
5. MONITOR

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | **8** | 9 | 10 |

This Substructure to the **SAP** is presented by the Monitor-function – i.e. the part in the instrument that has the responsibility to ensure that the (information) provided and assessed in the test is correct, reliable, valid and fair - irrespective of whether it is good or bad.

5.1 Lie Detector

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | **8** | 9 | 10 |

This factor, determining the reliability of the results provided by this instrument, indicates whether the testee was truthful in supplying the information about himself. The **SAP** is after all a self-reporting instrument and it is considered only human to present yourself as well as possible – especially if the outcome of the assessment is of significant importance to the testee; e.g. employment or promotion.

There are various mechanisms built into the body of the instrument as well as the computerised scoring programme of the test that 'measure' the truthfulness with which the testee provides the information about himself. One thereof is the **adaptation** that is made to the results to accommodate the degree of *manipulation* the testee allowed himself to attempt influencing the outcome of the test.

If the Lie-Detector score is below a four on the 10-point scale, the results obtained by the **SAP** is considered **invalid** and cannot be used to serve any purpose, except that it was established that the candidate deliberately and purposefully lied. That in itself is also a very useful bit of information to have about the person in this field.

During the instruction on completing the SAP, it was considered very important to inform/warn the testee at the outset of the testing that the instrument boasts a Lie-Detector and that it **will** pick up any deviation on the part of the testee in providing information about himself. The mere fact that the test-taker nonetheless confirmed lying, emphasizes his devious nature.

5.2 Consistency

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | **7** | 8 | 9 | 10 |

This is the degree to which the candidate consistently tends to deviate in answering test-items covering *like areas/subjects* as well as the extent to which he understood the items the test consists of and is in command of the language used and the purpose the test serves – especially scoring a '5' and above on the 10-point scale. A score of below a '4' on this scale represents a warning that the candidate is knowingly and deliberately lying and most probably is not in command of the language used in the test.

5.3 Unnatural Exaggeration

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | **9** | 10 |

This is the degree to which the candidate tends to inflate his responses on test-items as a typical behavioural disposition on his part with the deliberate and obvious intent to *enhance his own image*, rather than presenting a true and honest picture of himself. There is usually a high correlation tendency to be found between scales 2.3 and 5.3 – or there ought to be.

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SAP

SECURITY ASSESSMENT PROFILE

EXTENDED DEFINED REPORT

ORG: INTEGRITY INTERNATIONAL

NAME: LJ Frick

INTEGRATED SECURITY RATING (ISR)

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | **6** | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

The ISR consists of an electronically weighted combination of the five Substructure-assessments according to the relevant programme-guidelines as determined during the longitudinal research conducted in the security field with the development of the **SAP**.

The ISR provides the user of the **SAP** with the best single assessment of the person submitted to the said instrument. Much research was done and norms developed around this assessment and, although the entire profile covers the *35 scales offered by the SAP* which should be taken into consideration to ensure a well based and sound decision, the administrator can use this *single assessment for a variety of purposes, e.g.:*

- To **rank--order** a large number of testees in a global sense,
- To **screen** out obvious non-fit (low scoring) applicants from entering the security or related fields,
- To **categorise** and position people for specific levels of jobs in an organisational sense,
- To assist the responsible official in the initial stages of the development and introduction of a **Career Development Programme (CDP)** in a more complex organisation — especially one with multiple organisational units and/or different geographical elements/organisations.
- To assist/facilitate (in a structured and objective way) the conducting of a well based **merging process**.

As is by implication clear from the above, various norms exist to serve different purposes, e.g. a much lower ISR is expected for a new-comer to join a security unit at the entry level than for a seasoned security practitioner to aspire for appointment or promotion to a senior; even managerial or executive, position. The user must decide on the score required according to the purpose, level and availability (quality) of candidates.

A five on a 10-point scale remains the magical 'score' to divide the goats from the sheep at the entry-level!

ADAPTED SECURITY RATING (ASR)

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | **5** | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

Lastly the ASR is submitted for discussion and interpretation.

People do misrepresent themselves – some more than others. This is an undeniable fact and provision should be made for this phenomenon to level the playing field.

Naturally the *degree* to which a candidate misrepresented himself is used to *adapt* the ISR – with the Consistency the candidate demonstrated, as moderating factor. The stronger the attempt of the person to manipulate the outcome of the test, the more severe is the adaption process according to a structure interventional module incorporated in the scoring programme of the **SAP**. With a Lie-Detector at 10 on a sten, no adaption is made to the originally obtained Integrated Security Rating, but with each increasing level of 'lying' the degree of adaption is accordingly increased. At a Lie-Factor of 9 and a Consistency-Factor of 5, the adaptation factor is on 85%, but with the Lie-Factor being on 7 with the Consistency-Factor still on 5, the adaptation factor increased to 75% for example.

The adaptation process only continues to a Lie-Factor of 5 on the sten – on a '4' and less it is considered **invalid**.

The **ASR** is used in the same way as the ISR, but again the administrator will use his professional judgement as to how the assessment will serve the particular purpose and situation best.

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